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says: "Trade-marks not being copyright, registration of a trademark, or, what comes to be much the same thing, a title of a book
or paper, under the copyright acts, is unnecessary and useless."
And see (1846) SPENCER, Senator, New York Court of Errors;
Taylor v. Carpenter, supra, and Wolfe v. Barnett, 24 La. Ann.
97 ; 13 Am. Rep. 111.
HUGH WEIGHTMAN.
New York.

RECENT ENGLISH

DECISIONS.

House of Lords.
DEBENHAM v. MELLON.
The mere fact of cohabitation is not sufficient to give a wife an implied authority
io pledge her husband's credit for necessaries, and it is not necessary for the husband to prove that a tradesman supplying his wife with goods knew that he had
prohibited her from pledging his credit.
Jolly v. Bees, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628, followed and approved.

APPEAL by the plaintiffs against the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division.
The action was brought to recover the price of articles of dress
supplied by the plaintiffs to the defendant's wife during cohabitation, the articles being necessaries suited to her rank in life. The
defendant had forbidden his wife to pledge his credit, but this prohibition was not known to the plaintiffs.
BOWEN, J., before whom the action had been tried, entered judgment for the defendant, and his judgment was affirmed by the Court
of Appeal, consisting of BAGGALLAY, BRAMWELL and THESIGER,
L. JJ.: Law Rep., 5 Q. B. Div. 394.
The plaintiffs appealed to this House.
The facts in evidence are more fully stated in the judgment
delivered by the Lord Chancellor.

Benjamin, Q. C., and A. L. Smith, for the appellants.-When
a husband and wife are living together, the latter is always presumed to have authority to pledge her husband's credit for all
necessaries suitable to the station of the parties. This apparent
or ostensible authority cannot be secretly revoked, and therefore it
was for the respondent to show that the revocation of his wife's

DEBENHAb

v. M1ELLON.

authority to pledge his credit was known to the appellants. It is
submitted that the judgment of the Court of Appeal clothes the
wife with no more authority than a servant. Much of the language
in the judgments in Manby v. Scott, 2 Sm. L. C. 409, is favorable to the appellant's contention. [Lord SELBORNE, C.-In that
case the wife had been living apart from the husband without any
justification.] In -Dyer v. Bat, 1 Mod. 9, Lord Chief Justice
KELYNGE spoke of the decision in Manby v. Scott, as being "a
hard judgment," and he also said that "the husband must pay
for the wife's apparel unless she elope and he give notice not to
trust her." In Etheringtonv. Parrot,1 Salk. 118, Lord Chief
Justice HOLT said: "While they cohabit the husband shall answer
all contracts of hers for necessaries, for his assent shall be presumed to all necessary contracts upon the account of cohabiting,
unless the contrary appears." In Comyn's Digest, tit. "Baron
and _Peme," Q., it is stated that, "if a wife buy necessary apparel
for herself, the assent of the husband shall generally be intended."
Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Str. 1214, shows that a husband who fails to
supply his wife with necessaries is not relieved from liability even
by the fact that he has forbidden credit being given to her. In
W'aithman v. Wakefield, 1 Camp. 120, Lord ELLENBOROUGH told
the jury that, "where a husband is living in the same house with
his wife, he is liable to any extent for goods which he permits her
to receive there; she is considered as his agent, and the law implies
a promise on his part to pay the value." Montague v. Benedict,
3 B. & C. 631, may be relied upon on the other side, but there the
goods furnished were not necessaries. In Bolt v. Brien, 4 B. &
Ald. 252, the plaintiff had express notice that the defendant made
his wife an allowance, but Mr. Justice BAYLEY said that, "if a
husband makes no allowance to his wife, and he gives to her a general credit, she may contract debts for the necessary supply of herself and family, for which he will ultimately be liable." In Bead
v. Legard, 6 Exch. 636, it was held that a husband was liable for
necessaries supplied to his wife even while he was a lunatic, and
the judgment of Mr. Baron ALDERSON is founded upon the consideration that the marriage contract imposes upon the husband an
absolute obligation to support his wife. Ruddock v. Marsh, 1 H.
& N. 601, establishes the authority of the wife to bind her husband
in matters which are ordinarily under a wife's control, and in John.
ston v. Sumner, 3 H. & N. 261, Lord Chief Baron POLLOCK
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observed that, "if a man and his wife live together, it matters not
what private agreement they may make: the .vife has all usual
[Lord BLAcKBURN.-In that case the
authorities of a wife."
court declined to set aside the nonsuit.] In the present case the
judges in the courts below held that they were bound by Joly v.
Rees, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628, but in that case there was evidence
that the defendant had given his own orders for goods supplied for
the use of the household. This House is not, however, bound by
that case, which was the first in which a secret revocation of the
wife's authority was held to be an answer to a claim for goods supplied to her. It is submitted that the decision of the majority of
the judges in the Court of Common Pleas is in conflict with Buddock v. Marsh. Mr. Justice BYLES differed from the other members of the court, and in Morgan v. Cetwynd, 4 F. & F. 451,
Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN appears to have doubted whether
the decision of the Court of Common Pleas was correct.
Willis, Q. C., and McCall, for the respondent.-The mere fact
of marriage gives the wife no implied authority to pledge her husband's credit, except where the latter has, through no fault of the
wife, neglected to supply her with necessaries, and therefore it was
for the plaintiffs to give some evidence which would warrant an
inference of assent or ratification by the defendant. The observations made by Lord Chief Baron POLLocK in Johnson v. Sumner,
were not necessary for the decision of the case. Seaton v. Benedict, 5 Bing. 28, governs the present case. Lord Chief Justice
BEST there said: "A husband is only liable for debts contracted
by his wife on the assumption that she acts as his agent. If he
omits to furnish her with necessaries he makes her impliedly his
agent to purchase them. If he supplies her properly she is not his
agent for the purchase of an article, unless he sees her wear it
without disapprobation: In the present case the husband furnished
his wife with all necessary apparel, and he was ignorant that she
dealt with the plaintiff." In Reneaux v. Teakle, 8 Exch. 680,
Mr. Baron MARTIN observed that the wife's implied authority to
pledge her husband's credit "is only a presumption arising from
cohabitation, and may be rebutted," and that, "if a husband tells
his wife that he will not permit her to have a particular kind of
dress, she cannot bind him by ordering it." Beid v. Teakle, 13
C. B. 627, shows that the plaintiff must prove, in a case like the
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present, not only that the goods supplied were necessaries suitable
to the defendant's station in life, but also that the wife had either
an express or an implied authority to bind the husband by her
contracts. In Atcyns v. Pearce, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 763, Mr. Justice
CRESSWELL said that the decision'in .Buddock v. Marsh, could
only be sustained upon the supposition that the wife had acted
with the husband's cognisance. Jolly v. BRees, is precisely in
point, and has been unquestioned for sixteen years. In the recent
case of Eastland v. Burchell, Law Rep., 3 Q. B. Div. 432, Mr.
Justice LusH described the wife's authority to pledge her husband's
credit as "a delegated, not an inherent, authority."
They also referred to Dennys v. Sargeant, 6 C. & P. 419; Atkins
v. Curwood, 7 Id. 756; Spreadbury v. 07tapman, 8 Id. 371;
Mizen v. Pick, Id. 373 (note); Freestone v. Butcher, 9 Id. 643;
,Shoolbred v. Baker, 16 L. T. (N. S.) 359.
Benjamin, Q. C., replied.
Lord SELBORNE, C.-This appeal raises the very important
question whether the case of Jolly v. Bees, which was decided by
the Court of Common Pleas in 1864, and, so far as I am aware,
has never since been seriously questioned, was correctly determined.
The point decided in that case, as I understand it, was this: that
the question whether a wife has authority to pledge her husband's
credit is to be treated as a question of fact, to be determined upon
the circumstances of each particular case, whatever may be the
rules of law as to the prima facie presumptions to be drawn from
a particular state of circumstances. That principle is now controverted, and the first question for your lordships to decide is this,
whether the mere fact of marriage implies a mandate by law
making the wife, who cannot herself contract, except so far as she
may have a separate estate, the agent in law for the husband, to
bind him and to pledge his credit by what might be her own contract if she were a feme sole. It is sufficient to say that all the
authorities show that there is no such mandate in law, except in a
case of necessity, which necessity may, perhaps, arise when the
husband has deserted the wife, or has compelled her to live apart
fiom him without properly providing for her, but cannot, when the
parties are living together, be said ever prima facie to arise,
because, if, in point of fact, she is maintained, there is no prima
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facie evidence that the husband is neglecting to discharg' his par
ticular duty, or that there can be any necessity for the wife to run
him into debt for the purpose of keeping herself alive or supplying
herself with necessary clothing; I therefore lay aside the proposition that the mere fact of mariiage implies a mandate such as is
contended for on behalf of the appellants.
The next question is, does the law imply a mandate from cohabitation ? and, if it does, on what principle does it do so ? Cohabitation is not, like a marriage, a status or a new contract, but it is a
general expression for a certain condition of facts, and, if the law
does imply such a mandate, it must be as an implication of fact,
and not as a necessary conclusion of law. No doubt there are
authorities which say that the ordinary state of cohabitation carries
with it some presumption, some prima facie evidence of an authority to do those things which, in the ordinary circumstances of
cohabitation, it is usual for a wife to have authority to do. Mr.
Benjamin says that those words are not the best that might be
used for the purpose, but that " apparent authority" or "ostensible
authority" would be better. Those words may be very good words
for the ordinary state of circumstances in which the case of cohabitation between husband and wife exists, out of which the presumption arises, because in that state of circumstances the husband may
be said to do, or to evidently consent to, acts which hold out his
wife as his agent for certain purposes, and then the word "apparent" or "ostensible" becomes appropriate; but where the husband
neither does, nor consents to, anything to justify the proposition
that he has held out his wife as his agent, then I take it that the
question, whether he has, as a matter of fact, given his wife authority, is one which must be examined upon all the circumstances of
the case.
No doubt a husband, though he has not intended to hold out his
wife as an agent, and though she may not actually have had any
authority, may have so conducted himself as to entitle a tradesman
dealing with her to rely upon some appearance of authority. If he
has done so he may be liable, but the question must be examined
as one of fact, and all the authorities, as I understand them, practically so treat it when they speak of this as a presumption prima
facie, not absolute, not in law, but capable of being rebutted; and
when Lord Chief Baron POLLOCK, in Johnson v., Sumner, said
that all the usual authorities of a wife under those circumstances
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might be assumed, notwithstanding any private arrangement, I
apprehend that he had in view that state of facts during cohabitation, when a wife is managing her husband's house and establishment, which usually raises a presumption which, no doubt, when
once raised by the husband's acts or by his assent to the acts of
his wife, might not, as against the person relying upon that appearance of authority, be got rid of by a mere private agreement
between husband and wife.
In Beneauz v. Teakle, which was also cited during the argument, Lord Chief Baron POLLOCK said that the case of a wife did
not differ, at any rate in principle, from that of any one else in an
establishment. If there is an establishment of which there is a
domestic manager (although, perhaps, the wife is the most natural
domestic manager and the presumption may be strongest when she
is so), yet the presumption is the same if such domestic manager is
not a wife, but merely a woman living with a man, whether with
or without an assumption of the name of wife. Again, the principle is the same if the domestic management is delegated to a
housekeeper, or a steward, or any other kind of servant; and,
therefore, in all cases the question must be one of fact.
In the present case that state of circumstances is wanting which
usually accompanies cohabitation. There was no establishment,
and no living upon credit for the ordinary necessary purpose of
providing for the daily wants of a household so as to raise the
ordinary presumptions. The husband and wife were both servants
of a company which owned a hotel at Bradford, in which they lived;
and therefore there was, in fact, no domestic management. The
credit was given by a firm of London tradesmen to a woman living
at Bradford, and there was nothing to show that the appellants
were dealing upon the faith of any appearance of authority in the
wife, for they made out all the bills in her name, which, no doubt,
would not have prevented them from resorting to the husband, if
otherwise liable, but which certainly does not assist their case as
tending to show that they were misled by any appearance of authority into the belief that they were giving credit to him. It is
clear that the husband knew nothing about the ordering of the
goods; and the necessary conclusion of fact is, that he never, by
any act or consent, held out his wife as having authority, to the
appellants or to any other tradesmen.
If, then, the appellants can recover at all, it must be because
VOL. XXIX.-41
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there was either an authority in fact or an authority in law implied
from the necessity of the case. I think it may well be doubted
whether the ordinary presumption even shows the authority in the
state of facts which I have mentioned; but, taking it to be so,
since the clothes might be necessary for the wife, and it would be
the husband's duty to supply them if there were no other means
of doing so, the evidence conclusively shows that there was, in
fact, no authority. It appears that, more than four years before
the appellants had any dealing with the wife, when the husband
and wife were living in Devonshire, some other people gave credit
to the wife as the respondent's agent, but it is not suggested that
the appellants knew of this. The respondent disapproved of this
state of things, and put a stop to it, expressly revoking any authority which he might have previously given to his wife, and he
afterwards made her an allowance sufficient for any necessary purposes of dress, according to the state of his circumstances and
condition of life. It is urged that the appellants had no notice of
this revocation: but then they had no notice of the circumstances
which made the revocation necessary. They only knew that their
customer was a married woman, and her authority to bind her husband, as his agent, if it had ever been given, had ended four years
earlier.
Then comes the question whether the husband can be made liable because the articles supplied were in some sense necessaries.
As to this, it is clear that, when a reasonable allowance is made,
to
as in this case, by the husband to the wife, no authority at law
wife,
the
of
bind him can ex necessitate be implied on the part
even if she has purported to do so.
if you
I must add, without going through the authorities, that
than
rather
regard the principles which run through all the cases,
facts
casual dicta, which are necessarily colored by the particular
consistent
to be
before the judges, all the decisions will be found
held by the
was
what
with
as
well
as
justice,
with reason and
I theremajority of the Court of Common Pleas in Jolly v. Bees.
fore propose to your lordships to dismiss the appeal, with costs.
with that of
Lord BLACKBUR.-If the case were not identical

Jolly v. Bees, I might think it necessary to address your lordships
upon
at greater length, but I should advise your lordships to act
airived
Pleas
Common
of
the view that the majority of the Court
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at a right conclusion in deciding that case. No question arises
here (any more than in Jolly v. Ree8) as to what would have been
the case if the wife had been left destitute, without an allowance
suitable for her estate and condition, or if there had been desertion
and cruelty. This is merely a case where a husband and wife are
living together, although not in fact keeping up any establishment,
and where he has in fact made her an allowance which, so far as
one can judge from appearances, is sufficient to supply her with all
necessary clothing, and the jury were satisfied that he directed her
not to pledge his credit.
The first question, therefore, is this: whether the respondent's
wife had, from her position as a wife, any authority to pledge her
husband's credit, although such authority had been revoked by him.
I admit that the fact of a man living with his wife always affords
evidence that he intrusts her with such authorities as are ordinarily
given to a wife. In the ordinary case of the management of a
household the wife is the manager, and with such tradesmen as a
butcher or a baker she would have authority to pledge her husband's credit; but even then I do not think the presumption would
arise if the husband gave her the means of procuring the articles
without credit. In the present case, however, your lordships have
to determine whether the wife had a mandate to' order clothes,
which it would be proper for her in her station of life to have,
although the husband had forbidden her to pledge his credit and
had given her money to buy clothes.
For the reasons given by the majority of the Court of Common
Pleas in Jolly v. Bees, and by the judges of the Court of Appeal
in the present case, I am of opinion that there is nothing to authorize our holding that the wife had authority to pledge the husband's credit. I agree that if lie knew that she had got credit,
and had allowed the tradesmen to suppose that he sanctioned the
transactions with them, it might well be argued that there was
such evidence of authority that he could not revoke it without
giving notice of the revocation to all who had acted upon the faith
of his sanction. The general rule would be that which I have
stated; but where an agent is clothed with an authority which is
afterwards revoked, those who have dealt with him have a right to
say, unless the revocation has been made known to them, that the
principal is precluded from denying the continuance of that autlority in the continuance of which he has induced them, as reason-
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able persons, to believe. There have been many cases where a hisband has sanctioned his credit being thus pledged by his wife, but
there is no such case here. I cannot agree with my brother BYLES
that the cases have established that the fact of a wife living with
her husband alone entitles tradesmen to presume that the husband
has given an authority which he is precluded from afterwards deny
ing. I think that in such a case it is open to the husband to prove,
if he can, that such an authority does not, in fact, exist, that being
a question for the jury. This is not the case of the withdrawal of
an authority which has been once given, but the question is whether
the appellants, who had never before dealt with either the wife or
the husband, were entitled to assume that the authority was implied
from the mere fact of cohabitation, and I do not think that the law
gave them any right to do so.
That the true ground on which a wife
has power to bind her husband by her
contract, even for necessaries, is that of
agency, express or implied, is now generally well recognised: .Eastlandv. Burchell, 27 Am. Law Reg. 412, and note.
The more delicate question is, what effect
is to be given to the fact of cohabitation,
at the time the contract is made ? Is it
merely primd fade evidence of agency,
to be rebutted and controlled by the husband, by any evidence which shows that
in fact the agency does not exist ? or, is
it such a holding out by the husband
that the wife was his agent, as to bind
him to all persons who know of the cohabitation and do not know of the circumstances impugning such agency? In
the one case it is assumed, that by cohabitation the husband clothes his wife
with apparent authority to act for him
in such matters and, therefore, if he
chooses to revoke this authority and still
continue the cohabitation, he is bound
to give notice to third persons, in accordance with the rules applicable to
other agencies, in which private instructions or orders to an agent, inconsistent
with his apparent and usual authority
cannot avail. In the other case it is
supposed that every person trusts the
h-,sband at his peril; and with the bur-

den of proving that the actual buyer was
the duly authorized agent of the husband; of which cohabitation is one
means of proof, and only a means.
Cohabitation alone does not, on that
theory, create an agency, but only furnishes evidence that it has been sometime created, and therefore until the
plaintiff shows that the agency was once
created, there is no need for the husband
to show that the plaintiff had notice of
any circumstances avoiding or terminating it. The modern English cases certainly seem to favor the latter view:
Jolly v. Bees, 15 C. B. (N. S.) 628;
Eastland v. Burchell, Law Rep., 3 Q.
B. Div. 432; Debenham v. Mldlon;
Shoolbred v. Baker, 16 Law T. Rep.
(N. S.) 359 (1867) ; Chappell v. Nunn,
4 C. L. (Irish) 316. In this case, the
husband was the owner of considerable
real estate, his rental being over 50001.
a year, all of which, during his temporary confinement in an insane asylum,
was received by his wife for domestic
purposes. She, notwithstanding, bought
on his credit a pianette of the plaintiff,
and hired a piano, which the jury expressly found to be necessaries ; but it
was nevertheless held by the court that
he was not responsible, since his wife
had his entire income, which was amply
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auilfceent to support herself and the
family. See, however, Swife v. Nunn,
Weekly Notes for Nov. 30th 1878. On
the other hand, the ancient English and
the American cases, at least in their
dicta, have been generally considered
as laying down a different rule.
But in considering this question, two
-lasses of cases should be laid entirely
)ut of view, as not properly bearing on
One is
the precise point involved.
where the husband has created his wife
an implied agent in fact, by having pre"viously paid her bills to the plaintiff
without objection, or has known of her
purchases, and seen her use or consume
the goods with apparent acquiescence.
All such cases may rest safely enough,
on other and distinct grounds, and may
prove a wife to be agent, in the same
manner and with the same effect as in
case of a mother, sister or daughter.
The other class, which ought not to
influence the question here involved, is
where the husband has utterly failed in
his duty, and refused or neglected to
supply his wife at all, or turned her out
of doors without cause. Here an agency
may be created or implied, by law, irrespective of K.is assent or dissent, and,
therefore, no proof or evidence of actual assent is necessary.
The question still remains, does cohabitation alone create an agency or
liability in law to pay for necessaries,
until notice to the contrary is shown, or
is it but a piece of evidence to be
weighed for the plaintiff, and as primd
fade sufficient, in the absence of anyOtherwise
thing to the contrary?
stated, the question is : Is the presumption of agency, arising from cohabitation,
a presumption of law, or only a presumption of .fact-A presumption of
mere fact, because in most cases, and as
a matter of fact and usage, the wife
generally has such authority; and being
only a presumption of fact, of course,
liable to be controlled and overthrown
like any other presumption of fact.

And if capable of being overthrown,
is it rebutted by proof merely of some
facts and circumstances between husband and wife, inconsistent with such
authority f or, must those facts and circumstances have been communicated to
the tradesman who furnished the goods ?
The precise point has seldom arisen in
America, disconnected with other circumstances which might have haA weight
in determining the result. In many of
them the payment of prior bills, or the
knowledge and apparent assent to the
purchase, or the neglect or improper
conduct of the husband entered into the
case, and contributed more or less to the
result.
We may, perhaps, obtain some light
from other analogous cases on this subject. Suppose the implied or presumed
agency of the wife is sought to be terminated by other means than by furnishing a supply or ready money enough,
as in Debenham v. Mellon, viz., by the
elopement or adultery of the wife. Now
in such cases, it has always been considered that the fact itself terminated
the former presumed agency, and that it
was not necessary to prove that the
tradesman knew of the dopenent, or had
any notice from the husband not to trust
the wife: Hunter v. Boucher, 3 Pick.
289 ; Sturtevant v. Starin, 19 Wis. 268;
McCutchen v. McGahay, 11 Johns. 231;
Cooper v. Lloyd, 6 C. B. (N. S.) 519;
Morris v. Martin, 1 Str. 647.
Again, a wife living with her husband
is presumed to have authority to purchase
clothing for herself, suitable to his station in life; but this presumed agency
is controlled by proof, on the part of
the husband, that she already had sufficient similar articles purchased elsewhere ; and though this fact be unknown
to the tradesman supplying the last bill,
he cannot recover for the same, although
the jury expressly find that they were
"fitting for the station in life of the
defendant's wife :" Reneaux v. Tealde,
8 Exeh. R. 680; 24 Eng. L. and Eq.
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345 (1853) ; Holder v Cope, 2 C. &
K. 437. And see Atkins v. Curwood,
7 C. & P. 756; Richardson v. DuBois,
Law Rep., 5 Q. B. 51 ; Clark v. Cox,
32 Mich. 204 (1875), one of the bestconsidered cases on this subject on either
side of the Atlantic.
Again, suppose the implied agency is
terminated by a mutual separation, and
an agreement is made for an adequate
allowance, which is promptly paid by the
husband, or a proper provision is made
for her support with friends; a tradesman cannot sell to the wife on his credit,
even though he has-no notice of the separation or of the allowance. The facts
themselves put an end to the former
agency: Mizen v. Pick, 3 M. & W.
481; Pidyin v. Cram, 8 N. H. 350;
Cany v. Patton, 2 Ashm. 140 ; Kimball
v. Keyes, 11 Wend. 33 ; Reeve v. Conygham, 2 C. & K. 444.
In all of these analogies, however,
should be excluded the cases where the
husband, before the elopement or separation, has been accustomed to pay his
wife's bills to the same plaintiff; there,
notice might be necessary ; for he had a
right to suppose all things remain as
before ; but in the illustrations above
given, we suppose, as in Debenham v.
Mellon, that the bill in suit was the first
dealing with the plaintiff. See Stevens v.
Story, 43 Vt. 327, as to the importance
of this fact. See, also, Leake on Cont.,
p. 570; Ryan v. Sams, 12 Q. B. 460;
Fdlmer v. Lynn, 4 N. & M. 559.
In addition to the cases cited above,
another recently occurred in the Queen's
Bench, Wallis v. Biddick, reported in
22 Weekly Rep. 76 (1873), and apparently not elsewhere, having an important bearing on this point. There
the husband, while living with his wife,
had frequently bought goods of the
plaintiff, but always for ready money.
The husband and wife afterwards separated, and he paid her the allowance
mutually agreed upon in the separation
deed. She subsequently bought neces-

saries of the plaintiff, who had no notice
of the separation, and the jury found
the plaintiff believed and had reasonable
grounds for believing they still lived
together. They also found that at the
time of the purchase, the wife had suf
ficient allowance ; and the main question was, whether the husband was liable for not having given the plaintiff
any notice of the circumstances. On
this

point,

BLACKBUN,

J.,

said:

"Then comes the question whether the
person who seeks to enforce a claim on
the ground of the husband's authority to
the wife can say, ' You are precluded
from denying the authority, though, in
fact, it did not exist, because you did
not inform me that it had ceased to exist.' In Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Ex. 664,
Lord WENSLEYI)ALE, speaking of cases
of estoppel by conduct, says: ' As for
instance, a retiring partner, omitting to
inform his customer of the fact, in the
usual mode, that the continuing partners
were no longer authorized to act as his
agents, is bound by all contracts made
by them with persons, upon the faith of
their being so authorized.' He does not
enter into the question of what creates
a duty on a partner to give notice, but
only says, that if in the usual mode it
was necessary, there is an estoppel ; so
here there would be an estoppel, if notice were necessary, but the question is,
whether it was necessary. If the wife
had been authorized, during colabita.
tion, to deal on credit with the plaintiff.
and had actually so dealt, then, I think,
there would have been a duty on the
defendant to give the plaintiff notice
that her authority had been withdrawn.
A man, honestly believing and with
reasonable grounds, that they were still
cohabiting, might in that case possibly
be entitled to recover of the husband
by virtue of such an estoppel. But if
the tradesman had never been so authorized to give credit to the wife, but
merely knew, as any one else knew,
that the two were living together as man
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md wife, then, I think, there is no duty
on the husband to give notice to him of
Where a man has
the separation.
given out his name to the world as a
parmer, it is sometimes said, that when
he ceases to be one, a general notice
must be given; even that is a question.
But there is no authority for saying that
when a man is separated from his wife,
he must advertise the fact to all the
QUAIN, J., concurred, and
world."
judgment was rendered for the defendant.
In other words, the liability or nonliability of the husband ordinarily depends upon the existence or non-existence of certain facts, and not upon the
plaintiff's knowledge or ignorance of
those facts. If a husband refuse or
neglect to supply his wife with what is
necessary for decency and comfort in
his condition in life, he gives her credit
to procure it for herself, on his account
and at his charge; and it is immaterial
that the plaintiff had no knowledge of
the circumstances of the husband, or of
the necessities of the wife. The burden
is always on the plaintiff to show facts
which create the liability of the husbard; and if a person sells goods to
her upon his credit, without his express
authority, he takes the risk of being
able to prove an authority by implication of law : Eames v. Sweetzer, 101
Mass. 80; Gill v. Read, 5 R. I. 346;
Porter v. Bobb, 25 Mo. 36.
It should be stated, however, that
some cases are apparently in conflict
with Debenham v. 3ellon; the most recent of which, in England, perhaps, is
that of Ruddock v. Marsh, I H. & N. 601
(1856), in which a husband was held

liable for necessaries supplied and consumed in his temporary absence from
home, although he had left sufficient
money with his wife to buy them, and
directed her not to purchase on credit ;
but of these facts the plaintiff had no
notice. This was on the ground that the
tradesman had no notice that the wife
was supplied with ready money ; but one
fact making such notice important, is
stated in 38 Eng. L. & Eq. 516, viz., that
"the defendant's wife, who lived with
her husband, had been in the habit of
purchasing groceries and provisions for
the family, at the shop of the plaintiff,"
and apparently on credit, as the defendant's wife had "paid money on account
at different times." If so, this would
bring the case in harmony with Wallis
v. Biddick, above cited. Rarshaw v.
Merryman, 18 Mo. 106, also seems op.
posed to these cases. The husband,
there, during a temporary absence from
home, in California, had made suitable
provision for his wife and child to live
with a friend, where they did stay some
months; and then they went, without any
default in her support, to reside with the
plaintiff, who had no notice of the provision made for the wife by the husband;
and on that exact ground he was allowed
to recover; but this decision was apparently based largely upon Holt v. Brien,
4 B. & Ald. 252, in which it was held
that the plaintiff could not recover, because he had notice from the husband;
but it does not necessarily follow, that
he could have recovered, if he had not
received notice; a species of reasoning
not uncommon, however.
EDMUND H. BEmmTT.

